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Abstract
The Commonwealth has always had a central place in Malaya/Malaysia’s foreign policy, 
especially in the period immediately after independence and in the first few years of 
the formation of Malaysia. This was the period when Malaysia needed Commonwealth 
assistance most, in part, due to its requirement for external defence. Such assistance was not 
only relevant in the context of constructive cooperation but, more importantly, there was no 
other organization at that time in the region that could be of assistance to it. Whilst Britain 
was keen at accommodating Malaya as a member of the organisation upon independence, 
it were the Prime Ministers of Malaysia who played decisive roles in determining the extent 
of the relationship with the Commonwealth. The benefits Malaysia derived from such 
association were also heavily shaped by the styles and perceptions of successive Prime 
Ministers. Although the emergence of ASEAN, OIC, and  other similar bodies in later years 
of which Malaysia is also a member, has gradually eroded Malaysia’s profound attachment 
to the Commonwealth, however, it has no intention of leaving the Commonwealth. It has 
continued to offer some degree of both tangible and intangible support to the organisation 
in which successive Malaysian Premiers have acknowledged its relevance to the country’s 
foreign policy as well as it being a useful platform to articulate Malaysia’s views on political 
and socio-economic matters concerning, not only Commonwealth countries, but also the 
world at large. 
Keywords: Malaysia, Commonwealth, Relevance, Continuing Relations.
Introduction
The Commonwealth was the first international organization which the then Malaya joined 
as its tenth member in 1957 and remains so to this day. What should also be borne in mind is 
that Malaysia’s membership was coterminous with the country’s independence, though it is 
seldom mentioned. Today the Commonwealth has 53 member countries, all of which were 
former British colonies spreading across five continents. Malaysia’s membership in the 
Commonwealth raises several questions that may require some evaluation and assessment 
as to recent past and current policy on the Commonwealth. These assessments also involve 
judgments about its contribution to the organization and the likely responses to its conduct 
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on issues or problems. The pertinent questions are: first, the reasons that prompted the then 
Malaya to join the Commonwealth; secondly, the extent to which the Commonwealth was, 
or still is, relevant to Malaysia’s foreign policy; thirdly, the extent to which Malaysia has 
derived benefits from its membership; and finally, the degree of its involvement in this 
organization, including its participation in the programmes organized by the Commonwealth 
Secretariat. 
Genesis of the Commonwealth
Any discussion on the Commonwealth would not be complete without first briefly looking 
at the origin of Commonwealth itself. The Commonwealth is the term now officially used to 
designate this voluntary organization of 53 independent sovereign states that evolved out of 
the once mighty British Empire. The then British Empire was not only the largest political 
community in the world it was also the most varied in terms of geographical, racial, cultural 
and religious diversity. Within the borders of the British Empire lived one-quarter of the 
inhabitants of the globe – Europeans, Asiatics, Africans, Australiasians and Americans – of 
whom the vast majority were governed from London. These communities were at different 
stages of political development. Therefore the responsibility of governing the Empire was 
far greater than any political responsibility that fell on any British statesmen of that time. 
And, given the great difficulty in managing such vast overseas possessions, the Empire 
gradually came to a close after the first half of 1900, resulting in many more colonies gaining 
self-rule status. This was also a period in which the name British Empire changed to British 
Commonwealth of Nations, which was popularized by General Jan Christiaan Smuts, the 
then Prime Minister of South Africa.1 In 1949 the adjective “British” was dropped to reflect 
the changing nature of the association and since then it became known as Commonwealth 
of Nations, or now, just the Commonwealth. So the Commonwealth was not consciously or 
formally set up at any one moment, but evolved out of the British Empire, in which the sun 
never set. Indeed the modern Commonwealth started in 1947 whilst the existence of the ‘old’ 
Commonwealth could be traced back to hundreds of years before this.  Commonwealth, has 
almost as many interpretations as to its basic character as there are writers on the subject. 
Perhaps one of the best descriptions is what K.C. Wheare wrote in early 1952: “If the 
Commonwealth did not already exist, it would be impossible to invent”2 or, we might add, 
even to conceive one.
Many former colonies became members of the Commonwealth after the 2nd World War, 
namely, India in 1947 followed by Pakistan and Ceylon (now Sri Lanka). Several countries 
in Africa also joined the Commonwealth on attaining independence in the 1960s.  According 
to A. J. Cross, a British academic, “if the Commonwealth ever had a golden age it was surely 
in the 1950s”.3 The “golden age” referred to by Cross draws attention to the transformation 
of the Commonwealth from the white man’s preserve to a unique multilateral association 
of equals, following the independence of many ex-British colonies and then their decision 
to retain links with the Commonwealth. However, this did not mean that it was mandatory 
for former British colonies to become members of the Commonwealth. Some colonies 
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preferred not join or later decided to withdraw from the organization. Burma did not join the 
Commonwealth after becoming independent in 1948 and Ireland too, chose to be outside 
the Commonwealth when it obtained independence from Britain in 1949.
Commonwealth has also admitted new members which were not part of the British Colonial 
Empire such as Mozambique and Rwanda. However, it has been recognized that the 
transformation of a once mighty colonial empire into the present day association of fifty-
three member nations may be regarded as a remarkable achievement. This transformation 
prompted Arnold Smith, the first Secretary General of the Commonwealth (1965-1975) to 
say “a hundred years from now … historians will consider the Commonwealth the greatest 
of all Britain’s contribution to man’s social and political history”.4
Commonwealth as an International Organisation
We shall now consider in what sense the Commonwealth represents an ‘international 
organisation’ and why many former British colonies were attracted into joining it 
immediately upon attaining independence from Britain. An understanding of this concept 
is important as the Commonwealth is often nowadays regarded one of the longest surviving 
international organization, acquiring international respect and status as well as performing 
international roles. In his essay, William Dale, Legal Advisor to the British Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, makes reference to academic authorities, Fawcett and Crawford, 
who had described the Commonwealth as “a kind of international organization” and “a kind 
of residual international organization” respectively.5 An Australian scholar, Bruce Miller, 
offered another view where he questioned: “How are we to classify it (the Commonwealth) 
as an international entity? It has no written constitution like the United Nations and its 
specialized agencies; it can hardly be called an international organization … Its members 
are not even united by a common treaty of understanding. It is not a Zollverein. It is not 
a community. In fact it does not fit into any of the recognized international categories. 
Yet I have insisted that it is a going concern. Which name would suit it best? My own 
choice is to call it a concert of convenience”.6 This was an appropriate description of the 
Commonwealth in mid-1950s and early 1960s, that is, prior to the establishment of the 
Commonwealth Secretariat in 1965. 
Dale’s exposition was implicitly supported earlier by J.D.B. Miller who wrote: “The 
Commonwealth does not have a constitution, but it does have institutions which are 
outward signs of its existence… The institutions of the Commonwealth as they stood in 
1964 are divided into four kinds: the Crown, the rights of members to enter or leave the 
Commonwealth; means of consultations between members; and institutions shared between 
members in order either to enrich the Commonwealth association or to further the joint and 
several interests of the members”.7Margaret Ball8 and Margaret Doxey9 have each expressed 
similar opinions on what constitutes an association and an international organization. They 
claimed that the Commonwealth does not need a constitution, and what is essential is for 
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the Commonwealth to be active internationally, since the more effectively it acts the more 
it acquires the status commonly referred to as international personality.
Without doubt, the Commonwealth has all the essential ingredients, including a functioning 
Secretariat, necessary to qualify for the status of an organization capable of international 
action. Indeed, the Commonwealth Secretariat provides the machinery to run the organization, 
without which any organization cannot hope properly to organize and implement its 
objectives in the long-run. In view of its large increase in membership since 1957, such 
a set-up is needed to coordinate and facilitate intra-Commonwealth activities. Until 1965 
the Commonwealth has had no such machinery, and all Commonwealth activities were 
organized and coordinated by the British Civil Service in the Whitehall in London. Clearly 
with changing times it is unthinkable for an association as large as the Commonwealth to 
function at all efficiently without a properly constituted bureau or secretariat.
It is interesting to note that the Malaya’s membership in the Commonwealth was partly 
inspired by India’s accession to Commonwealth membership. Recalling on the influence of 
India, or rather Jawaharlal Nehru, in transforming the Commonwealth into a new association 
of equals that serves all members, Malaya gave particular attention to that part of Nehru’s 
speech over radio in New Delhi on 10 May 1949 in which he said: “It may be remembered 
that the Commonwealth is not a super-state in any sense of the term. We have agreed to 
consider the King as the symbolic head of this association. But the King has no function 
attached to that status in the Commonwealth. As far as the constitution of India is concerned, 
the King has no place and we shall owe no allegiance to him”.10  Nehru’s speech, according 
to Ghazali Shafie, then a senior bureaucratic and later Permanent Secretary to Malaya’s 
Foreign Ministry, had a tremendous influence at the time when Malaya was preparing for 
independence. He further added that had India been unsuccessful in bringing about these 
changes in Commonwealth relations, it is doubtful if Malaya’s decision to retain monarchial 
institution and at the same time remain in the Commonwealth would have been favourably 
considered. 11
Factors that Prompted Malaya Joining the Commonwealth
British Colonial Rule
If there is one factor which may be cited as the principal reason for Malaya’s membership in 
the Commonwealth after independence it is the British legacy – the outcome of eighty-three 
years of British rule in Malaya. Over the years some substantial ties developed – political, 
economic, educational, legal, military and cultural with Britain. British rule also produced 
by 1940s and 1950s Malayan elites who were convinced that closer links with Britain and 
full membership of the Commonwealth would be a crucial facility for the realization of 
Malayan, later Malaysian, national interests. Further, it was certainly the preferred British 
policy that its colonial territories, including Malaya, as they reached self-government, 
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should remain in the Commonwealth.12 The final decision to grant independence to Malaya 
was reached in February 1956 when the Constitutional Conference, which met in London, 
agreed that full self-government and “independence within the Commonwealth” for Malaya 
should be proclaimed on 31 August 1957.
The Security Circumstances in Malaysia
A second reason for then Malaya joining the Commonwealth was its earnest desire to 
maintain close relations with such friendly countries as Britain, Australia, New Zealand and 
Canada, who had generously offered their support and assistance during the Emergency, 
purportedly supported by Communist China; the “Konfrontasi” arising from Indonesia’s 
claim that the formation of Malaysia was a ‘neo-colonialist plot’ and that it was a conscious 
attempt by Britain to perpetuate its influence in the region; and the Sabah dispute in 
which the Philippines exerted their sovereignty, jurisdiction and proprietary ownership, as 
successor to the heirs of the Sultan of Sulu, over the whole of Sabah.13 The support given to 
Malaysia by the ‘old’ members of the Commonwealth was seen as an outstanding example 
of constructive cooperation between the old and the new Commonwealth members. 
Another major security reason for Malaya’s accession to Commonwealth membership 
was the political circumstances in the region at the time as evidenced by the ‘Cold War’ 
which had divided the region into East-West confrontation along ideological lines between 
communist countries and western-led democracies. For Malaya, accession to Commonwealth 
membership, though seen as adopting a pro-west policy, was considered the correct path 
in the context of securing military assistance and other logistical support against outside 
interference over the sovereignty of a ‘small’ and newly independent country.
Malaysia – Commonwealth Relations Since Independence
For a better understanding of the continuity of the Malaysia-Commonwealth relations, it is 
also vital to have a picture of the country’s links with the organization during successive 
prime ministers namely Tunku Abdul Rahman, Tun Abdul Razak, Tun Hussein Onn and 
Dr Mahathir Mohamed. In Malaysia there is much evidence to suggest that prime ministers 
have invariably taken a major personal interest in foreign relations with countries and 
in intergovernmental organisations. The cabinet system of government, (Parliamentary 
System) to a very considerable extent, allows successive prime ministers wide power in 
foreign affairs. Moreover, the absence of a Cabinet Committee on Foreign Affairs, along 
the  lines of the UK Parliament Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, as well as the lack of 
debate in Malaysian Parliament on foreign affairs help explain the important role its prime 
ministers play in formulating and articulating foreign policy. The Malaysian Parliament 
itself plays no role in foreign policy development, and references to foreign relations usually 
revolve around a ministerial answer to parliamentary questions, usually about expenses and 
visits by the Prime Minister or Foreign Minister to other countries, or to seek clarification 
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on Malaysia’s preferred position on events taking place elsewhere. Perhaps it may be of 
interest to mention that foreign policy issues have never interrupted or caused a break of 
government in Malaysia. The fact that Malaysia has enjoyed an uninterrupted membership 
in the Commonwealth since 1957 is indicative of the support, styles and concerns which 
each prime minister brought to the organisation. 
The Role of Tunku Abdul Rahman
It cannot be denied that the prime-mover for Malaya becoming a member of the 
Commonwealth was Tunku Abdul Rahman, the first Prime Minister of independent 
Malaya. The Tunku was always ready to say that it was a useful association and in 
defending it he was quoted as saying “We have made our choice. That choice is with the 
Commonwealth, and it is irrevocable. We will either float or sink with our British friends 
and the great Commonwealth which their leadership has inspired”.14 Expressing much the 
same sentiment several years later he added: “Malaya has been a staunch supporter in all 
fields of activities connected with the Commonwealth and will do all she can to make the 
Commonwealth a living force”.15 In fact, the Tunku was emphatic that membership did not 
in any manner obstruct Malaysia in carrying out its own independent policies and objectives 
in international affairs.
There may be several reasons to account for the Tunku’s strong affinity for the 
Commonwealth.  First, was his strong sentimental attachment to Britain and one way of 
retaining this link was through the Commonwealth. The attachment he had with Britain, 
in part, stemmed from his early exposure to the British education system but it was also 
based on his recognition of the pragmatic need for Britain to assist Malaya in the face of 
the many problems which independence entailed. Many of his political colleagues in the 
United Malay National Organisation (UMNO)/Alliance and senior bureaucrats, many of 
whom were also the product of western education, shared the Tunku’s sentiments. But of 
course these emotional sentiments and pragmatic calculations of Tunku unfortunately, had 
not permeated the rank and file of Malayans generally. 
A second reason was the Tunku’s strong view on the multi-racial character of the 
Commonwealth. Its membership comprises races and religions spreading across five 
continents. The plural nature of Malayan society which the Tunku helped to nurture was 
aptly put by Nicholas Mansergh: “makes acceptance of the Commonwealth, itself a plural 
society, easier and also more practical, since the Commonwealth provides one means for the 
exchange of information on the easing of ethnic tension”.16
Another very important reason that prompted Tunku to join the Commonwealth was because, 
as mentioned earlier, due to the security situation in Malaysia and in the region prevailing 
then. The Tunku worked indefatigably in winning support from ‘old’ members of the 
Commonwealth in fighting the communists, defending against Indonesia’s confrontation, 
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endorsing the formation of Malaysia and obtaining military support through the Anglo 
Malayan Defence Agreement (AMDA) and later the Five Power Defence Arrangement 
(FPDA). Though the later body is not directly under the auspices of the Commonwealth, 
none the less it operates in the spirit of bilateral cooperation between Commonwealth 
members. 
Tun Abdul Razak Hussain
Tun Abdul Razak succeeded Tunku on 22 September 1970 against a background of a 
serious race riots that occurred on 13 May 1969 in Malaysia. His premiership also witnessed 
some important external events taking place in the East and Southeast Asia, namely the 
proposed US military disengagement in Asia, the British pull-out East of Suez, the rise of 
Communist China and it assuming China’s UN seat, and China-US rapprochement. All 
these events prompted Razak to embark on a review of Malaysia’s foreign policy priorities 
including Malaysia’s relations with the Commonwealth in the changing political relations 
in the region.
Speaking in Parliament on his new foreign policy priorities he said: “In formulating and 
executing our foreign policy we cannot take a theoretical view of things. We can only 
proceed by accepting the world as it is, and by so managing our affairs as to ensure the 
integrity and sovereignty of our country” … and added “We are living in a world very 
different from that which we obtained up to a few years ago … we will adopt a foreign 
policy that is careful, coherent, far-sighted in conformity with our principles and our basic 
national interest to ensure our own security and our own stability”.17 Security here did not 
mean just external security or military security. Political security was seen as a fundamental 
aspect of the national security of Malaysia.
Razak, together with the Tunku, was privy to all foreign policy matters affecting 
Malaysia, including his support for Commonwealth membership in 1957. For Razak, the 
Commonwealth was a practical instrument not only for the political and economic policies 
but also for strengthening relations with other countries. Like Tunku, he recognized that 
it did not restrict Malaysia’s independent foreign policy and he showed and expressed his 
support by attending most Commonwealth Heads of Government Meetings (CHOGMs), 
first as Tunku’s deputy and then as prime Minister.
Although Razak thus continued to support the Commonwealth, it could be said that he 
was not as enthusiastic as the Tunku was. Unlike the Tunku, Razak had less sentimental 
regard for the links with the organization in particular, and Britain in general, though he 
felt very grateful to those members, such as Britain, Australia and New Zealand, which had 
contributed significantly to the defence of the then Malaya, and later Malaysia. Razak’s 
attitude can be viewed from two perspectives: first, he had spent a much shorter time in 
Britain than the Tunku, and was not much influenced by the British ethos; secondly, when 
he assumed office the pattern of power relations in the region was different from the time of 
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independence. He saw relations between most of the member states revolved less and less 
around the commonwealth connection. Despite this, Razak felt it was sufficient to ‘keep’ 
Malaysia’s membership alive but not to ‘overplay’ it, as other regional and international 
organizations to which Malaysia belonged also required support. Hence there was a 
gradual erosion of the British influence as well as the significance of the Commonwealth in 
Malaysia’s foreign policy. 
For Razak, the Commonwealth “in its present form is neither dead nor dying.” He added 
that although there is no constitutional or legal tie that binds together countries of the 
Commonwealth … its members are agreed on one vital principle, that they seek to preserve 
this Commonwealth of free peoples as an instrument through which they, together with 
other nations, which share their objectives, can cooperate for the common good and for the 
preservation of world peace”.18 On Malaysia’s adhesion to Commonwealth membership, 
Razak argued that there was nothing to be gained by staying away from the organization 
which already existed and had brought benefit to its members, even if these benefits were 
relatively small.
Tun Hussein Onn
Hussein succeeded Razak as Prime Minister of Malaysia following the latter’s untimely 
death in January 1976. Hussein made no major changes in the basic foreign policy which 
Razak had laid down. Hussein, for his part, did not advance any new foreign policy initiatives 
in the international politics of Southeast Asia. But Hussein continued to consolidate those 
foreign policies laid down by his predecessor.
With regard to the Commonwealth, there is no evidence to suggest that Hussein was critical 
of the organisation.  After all this was an organization which his predecessors had approved 
of and had decided to join at the time of independence based on the fact that it was in 
Malaysia’s interest to become a member and continue to remain in the Commonwealth. 
Hussein reiterated his support for the Commonwealth in his opening statement at the 
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) held in London on 10 June 
1977, which was the first CHOGM he attended. He said: “I also bring with me the tradition 
of strong support for this unique institution, the Commonwealth of Nations, and the high 
ideals that it stands for. Even before independence, my late father, had sought to identify 
my country with high aspirations of the Commonwealth” … “I would like to give you my 
assurance of our continuing support and express the hope that the Commonwealth will 
grow to be more meaningful and effective in the years ahead”.19  Hussein stayed away from 
the Lusaka CHOGM (1-7 August 1979) due to his poor health but sent his then Foreign 
Minister, Tengku Ahmad Rithauddeen, to represent him.
It needs to be mentioned that Hussein’s strong support for the Commonwealth can be 
explained in terms of similar factors that had influenced his predecessors (Tunku and 
Razak). First, Hussein had a long association with Britain and its administration dating back 
to before Malaya’s independence. Secondly, was his exposure to British tertiary education 
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and to the political and social systems during his stay in England. Beyond this, Hussein 
found no reason to critcise Malaysia’s close connection with the Commonwealth which his 
predecessors had made to work, and which had served Malaysia’s foreign policy interest 
well in the past.
Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohamad
Mahathir became the fourth Prime Minister on 16 July 1981, succeeding Hussein Onn 
who stepped down because of poor health. Mahathir’s tenure of office deserves special 
consideration because early in his premiership he put Malaysia’s connection with the 
Commonwealth to a severe test and then subsequently went on none the less to host Kuala 
Lumpur CHOGM in September 1989. Mahathir assumed office against a background of 
greatly improved political stability in the country as well as in the external events affecting 
Malaysia. This was in marked contrast with the internal and external difficulties which had 
previously prevented the Tunku and Razak from doing more in foreign policy, including 
undertaking high profile engagement overseas. 
Mahathir came to office as a forthright, tough and hard-hitting man with an intense sense 
of responsibility. With regard to foreign policy, Mahathir’s approach did not involve 
drastic changes in substance, rather he brought robustness and assertiveness to policies 
which were previously lacking. One departure from the previous policy was a shift from 
traditional association with the west, while still maintaining close diplomatic and economic 
relations with them was necessary. His ‘reorientation’, however, was seen as a follow-
up to the policies that Razak had initiated. But Mahathir went a step further in ensuring 
that Malaysia was not trampled on by others and hoped the country would emerge as a 
developed country which could enjoy much the same international respect as any other 
developed nation enjoyed without having to lose its own cultural and spiritual values. Again, 
in contrast to his predecessors, Mahathir had no hesitation in offering brusque opinions 
about matters affecting Malaysia’s interest. Those familiar with his style and approach are 
often tempted to praise Mahathir for giving his country much more diverse and vibrant, and 
at times controversial, policies. This approach, however, reflected Mahathir’s experience 
and perception of world events, and his own conception of Malaysia’s proper role on the 
international stage.
In this regard, one foreign policy matter which evoked conflicting emotions during Dr 
Mahathir’s administration in the early 1980s was the Commonwealth. Since becoming a 
member in 1957 no controversy over Malaya and then Malaysia’s membership was recorded 
during the first twenty-three years. Neither was there evidence to suggest that Mahathir had 
an inbuilt suspicion of international organisations, though he had quite often expressed 
reservations about the roles and performances of some of them such as the Organization of 
Islamic Conference, Non-Aligned Movement, ASEAN or even the United Nations. But, the 
Commonwealth was the first international organization to receive public reprimand from 
Malaysia’s Prime Minister. Mahathir felt that the Commonwealth had engaged in “too much 
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talk with no tangible results”.20 This explains why the Commonwealth was relegated to last 
place in Mahathir’s first publicly declared order of Malaysia’s foreign policy priorities. The 
question that is often asked is: What went wrong? There were several reasons to account 
for this.
First, Mahathir linked the Commonwealth too closely with Britain. He seemed to blame 
the Commonwealth for many unwelcome features of Britain’s policies toward Malaysia 
or whenever Britain was at odds with the majority view already agreed by Commonwealth 
members. Such an approach was in direct contrast with the basic perception of the 
Commonwealth held by his predecessors. The Tunku, in particular, insisted that it was 
not proper for Malaysia to take on the Commonwealth on grounds of disagreement with 
Britain on specific bilateral issues, such as higher university tuition fees, extra landing rights 
for Malaysia airlines, criticism over Malaysia’s acquisition of British plantation company, 
Guthrie, on the London Stock Exchange, the Pergau Dam project, and the reclamation 
of Carcosa Hill.21 In response to these bilateral difficulties with Britain, Mahathir even 
instituted a Buy British Last Policy which unfortunately did not last, while at the same time 
he introduced the Look East Policy instead. 
Secondly, Mahathir already had reservations about the Commonwealth long before he 
became Prime Minister. He described his predecessor’s foreign policy, particularly that of 
the Tunku, as influenced by an apron-string complex manifested in the defence treaty with 
Britain in the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement (AMDA), the presence of Australian and 
New Zealand forces without the formality of an agreement, the membership and firm belief 
in the Commonwealth” and further argued that the “confidence in Malaya and Malaysia 
as a truly independent country was lacking”.22  These perspectives have evoked varying 
responses. Given the political realities of Southeast Asia at that time and the political events 
affecting Malaya, one wonders why the policy nurtured by the Tunku was considered 
out of place. Independence should not mean refusal to cooperate with Britain or other 
Commonwealth partners.  A defence agreement with them was, therefore, one form of 
cooperation between sovereign states.
AMDA was formally abrogated in 1971 and was replaced by the Five Power Defence 
Arrangement (FPDA), involving the five original “partners” of AMDA. FPDA does not 
resemble AMDA but takes a new form of defence cooperation. Unlike AMDA, the FPDA 
does not automatically commit Australia, Britain and New Zealand to come to the defense 
of Malaysia in the event the country is under attack. The arrangement merely provides 
consultation and, at regular intervals, conducts joint military exercise for the purpose of 
deciding what measures should be taken jointly or separately in relation to such attack or 
threat. Whilst Malaysians generally held the view that the FPDA still retains or provides 
that Commonwealth link, Mahathir condemned this arrangement as “worth less than a scrap 
of paper”.23 What has puzzled many observers is that despite his critical view of FPDA 
before he came to power and, given his twenty-two years as prime minister, he did nothing 
to wreck FPDA but offered it as ‘psychological’ support and a sense of belonging to a group 
of like-minded countries that share similar aspirations and security concerns.24
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Thirdly, Dr Mahathir’s own preference was bilateralism rather than multilateralism. In 
defending his preference he said on 15 July 1982 in an interview coinciding with his first 
anniversary in office: “We find that bilateral relations enable us to know people more 
intimately, know what their problems are and how we can work with them, whereas 
the multilateral approach of the past has not been yielding that kind of intimacy and 
understanding … I think by and large, the foreign policy we [Mahathir] have mapped out is 
good for us because it is a much more positive policy”.25
Viewed in this light, would not such a preference contradict or at least qualify Malaysia’s 
participation in ASEAN, OIC or other multilateral institutions? Perhaps Mahathir had 
dismissed the significance of multilateralism too soon. Speaking on foreign policy 
several years later, the then Malaysia’s Foreign Minister, Abu Hassan Omar, commented: 
“Multilateralism will continue to be another priority for our foreign policy … We see 
multilateralism playing a crucial role in helping to promote solutions of the many problems 
that confront us … It is for this reason that Malaysia has been an active participant in such 
international organizations like the UN, the Commonwealth, ASEAN, the NAM, the Group 
of 77, and the OIC”.26
However, despite his early misgivings, or rather disenchantment with the Commonwealth, 
Mahathir showed no intention of wrecking it, though many have speculated that his 
instructions to the Malaysia’s Institute for Strategic and International Studies (ISIS), a 
quasigovernment think-tank, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to undertake a review of 
Malaysia’s membership in the Commonwealth, was aimed at taking the country out of the 
organization. In fact, the reviews27 which incorporated many recommendations were used 
by Mahathir to fathom out what the Commonwealth could possibly and practically mean 
for Malaysia. Some practical examples of his continuing support were his decision to offer 
Kuala Lumpur as host to two major Commonwealth events: the biennial Commonwealth 
Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in September 1989 and the Commonwealth 
Games in 1998, both of which helped enhance the profile of Malaysia’s foreign policy in 
the Commonwealth as well as proof of Malaysia‘s remaining in the organization, though in 
a much lesser role.
At the Kuala Lumpur CHOGM Mahathir was elected to Chair the High Level Appraisal 
Group (comprising 10 Heads of Government which had hosted CHOGMs since 1971), whose 
task was to identify possible roles which the Commonwealth might need to play beyond 
the 1990s and recommend as solutions to the inadequacies of the present Commonwealth. 
Given his ‘renewed’ interest, Mahathir had no qualm about accepting it as this also afforded 
him the opportunity to make some notable contribution to the review of the Commonwealth, 
an organization which he often criticized for not doing enough, or to quote two of his earlier 
critical phrases “a talking shop” and “too much talk and nothing tangible”. His other major 
achievement was to bring the Commonwealth Games to Malaysia, a country not known for 
hosting international sporting events.28
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Besides the two major Commonwealth events described above, Mahathir also welcomed 
Malaysia’s other roles, even though minor, to reflect his new-found support for the 
organization, and these, among others, are mentioned below: 
i. Membership of the eight-member Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group on 
Harare Principles (CMAG) on fundamental values such as democracy, human rights, 
rule of law, independence of judiciary. Malaysia has served four times in the two-
year term in CMAG – 1995-97, 1999-2001, 2005-07 and 2007-2009 – whose remit 
was to deal with member countries that breached or found persistently in violation 
of the principles contained in the Harare Declaration, especially the overthrow of 
democratically elected government by unconstitutional means.
ii. Hosted the headquarters of Commonwealth Tourism Centre in Kuala Lumpur.
iii. One of the seven Commonwealth countries (also including Australia, Canada, 
India, New Zealand, Singapore and UK) to make annual financial contributions 
to the budgets of the Joint Office for Commonwealth permanent Missions to the 
United Nations. The Joint Office provides accommodation and facilities for the 
ten least developed member countries to enable them to maintain representation at 
the UN. These countries are: Belize, Dominica, Gambia, Grenada, the Maldives, 
Nauru, Samoa, the Seychelles, Soloman Islands, and Tuvalu. The Joint Office is an 
independent legal entity administered by the Commonwealth Secretariat.
It should be mentioned here that little could be said about the role played by Tun Abdullah 
Ahmad Badawi, Mahathir’s successor, as his tenure in office merely consolidated the policies 
of his predecessors towards the Commonwealth. And, any discussion on the role played by 
the current Prime Minister, Najib Abdul Razak, is bound to be interim and provisional. 
Indeed, it will remain so for several years, or even longer, until he leaves office. 
The above paragraphs highlighted the variety of approaches taken by the first four 
prime ministers with regard to membership of the Commonwealth. Despite the different 
perspectives each prime minister brought to this organization, all of them have acknowledged 
that Malaysia should retain its membership in the Commonwealth which they regarded 
as being compatible with maintaining good relations with other countries and numerous 
international instruments of which Malaysia is also an active member. Interestingly, there 
is no record suggesting of any attempt to withdraw or suspend from membership of the 
Commonwealth – thus Malaysia being on record for enjoying uninterrupted association 
with this international organization since 1957.  
Malaysia’s Role in the Commonwealth
This section seeks to examine the responsibility and role of Malaysia toward the organization. 
Generally, it has a two-fold responsibility, namely to uphold the values of the organization 
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so as to provide a unifying element and to ensure the fullest possible degree of continued 
cooperation with other members in pursuit of national objectives. At the same time a 
member must provide the means to realize the objectives or programmes laid down by the 
organization, or at least those that they perceived as useful. For the organization to function 
well it is not sufficient to expect what the organization can offer to members but, equally 
important, the level of member’s participation has a direct bearing on the effectiveness of 
an organization.
Virtually all international organisations are dependent on financial support from members 
in order to continue in existence and carry on their work. Those financial contributions, 
together with other contributions of a material nature, constitute the most visible costs of 
membership.29 Britain, for instance, is the largest single contributor to the budgets of the 
Commonwealth Secretariat and it also provides, among others, a building for the Secretariat 
at Marlborough House in London, while the other member countries also share the brunt 
of financial contribution as an important measure of member support for the organisation. 
Financial contributions to the Secretariat budget are on an agreed scale based on population, 
national income and capacity to pay, and the UN scales are used as a broad guide. Malaysia, 
in particular, has contributed its fair share to the budget of the Commonwealth Secretariat. 
Malaysia now stands as the eighth largest contributor, after Britain, Australia, New Zealand, 
Canada, India, Singapore and Brunei, to the budgets of the Commonwealth, which is 
indicative of its continuing and strong support. It also contributes to the Commonwealth 
Science Council, Commonwealth Youth Programme, Commonwealth Fund for Technical 
Cooperation and the Commonwealth Foundation. In addition, Malaysia has participated in 
many Observer Missions organized by the Commonwealth Secretariat to monitor general 
elections in member countries that requested for such a mission and, in supporting this 
exercise Malaysia provided financial assistance to the Secretariat so that Malaysian officials 
could also be included in the team.
The other form of support is expressed by the contribution of personnel to work in the 
organisation’s Secretariat. Given Malaysia’s financial support, it is expected to nominate its 
qualified nationals, normally from the country’s civil service, for appropriate positions in 
the organization, but this was, and still is, lacking when compared to nationals nominated 
by other member states. There are two reasons for this: first, it is not the preferred strategy 
of government to provide special exposure to our public servants in the working of 
international organisations; and secondly, there is a view to suggest that Malaysia’s public 
servants are already comfortable in their country with facilities adequately provided for 
by their government and, therefore, working in the international secretariats are not a 
motivational factor. In 2009, the Commonwealth Secretariat employed 305 international 
staff, of whom 4 were Malaysians, and all were candidates from the non-government sector 
and holding positions in the low profile departments in the Secretariat. For the moment 
Malaysia is an “under-represented” country in terms of staffing at the Commonwealth 
Secretariat. Malaysia’s leaders have claimed that they wanted to play a high profile role in 
international affairs and, look at in this context, having a team of qualified and experienced 
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Malaysians in this field would only provide them with up ‘back-up’ consultations or counsel 
at international forums and events but would also enable them to vie for senior positions 
in numerous international organizations, of which Malaysians are said to be far under 
represented. 
Indeed, in 2007 Malaysia almost had a good chance of having its public figure holding the 
highest position in the Commonwealth Secretariat, to succeed out-going Secretary General, 
Chief Emeka Anyouku of Nigeria. The government had nominated Datuk Dr. Rais Yatim30, 
a cabinet minister, as one of four equally credible candidates vying for this position. 
According to the feedback conducted by Malaysia’s Foreign Ministry, it gave the Malaysian 
candidate a good lead in that it was Asia’s turn to hold that position. Unfortunately, about 
two months into the nomination Rais Yatim bowed out citing domestic commitments. 
Conclusion
This article has shown that Malaysia’s early foreign policy and the initial decision to 
accede and then to continue with Commonwealth membership was to a considerable 
extent a function of cordial relations between Malaysia and Britain, and shaped by the four 
successive Prime Ministers. These men, perhaps with some degree of exception for Hussein 
Onn, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi and the current Prime Minister, have brought distinctive 
styles to their office, and to Malaysia’s foreign policy. Both Malaysia’s foreign policy and 
the character of the Commonwealth changed quite considerably between 1957 and 2013, 
not least because of a changing regional and international context principally by the policies 
of successive Prime Ministers.
The achievement and benefits which Malaysia has derived from its 57 years’ membership 
of the Commonwealth are still difficult to determine. The most visible instances in which 
the Commonwealth appeared to dominate Malaysia’s foreign policy were during the 
Tunku’s premiership, especially in the early post-independence years. During Indonesia’s 
“Konfrontasi” against Malaysia, Commonwealth support was of value in a variety of ways.
The keen support which the Commonwealth enjoyed in Malaysia at the time of and for 
several years after independence had, by the end of 1981, diminished. The reasons for this 
change of attitude and priority stemmed from several considerations. First, the changing 
events in the Southeast Asian region in particular, and of the Commonwealth character in 
general. These afforded Malaysia the excuse to look for other intergovernmental regional 
organizations which, it was thought, could serve as important instruments for Malaysian 
foreign policy interests. Therefore, its membership of the ASEAN, the OIC and other 
intergovernmental organizations provide some explanation in this regard. Viewed in this 
light, it is certainly true that the more memberships any one state, or rather Malaysia holds, 
the less must be its commitment to any one particular organization, thus the Commonwealth 
could no longer be an instrument of first importance in Malaysia’s political and economic 
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policies. Secondly, the Commonwealth has always been seen by Malaysian elites at least 
being capable of fulfilling limited functional requirements. This cannot now be a major 
factor in Malaysia’s development in particular, or for the developing countries within the 
Commonwealth, in general. Thirdly, the Anglo-centric sentiments among the new generation 
of Malaysian leaders and the articulate sections of the bureaucrats have diminished over 
time. Fourthly, there is a general lack of knowledge about the Commonwealth among 
Malaysians and the government as well as the main stream media, for their part, are doing 
little to explain and promote it. Finally, the strain in bilateral relations with Britain especially 
in the early 1980s was one of the main reasons for Malaysia’s evident disenchantment with 
the Commonwealth.
Despite all this, Malaysia’s connection with the Commonwealth has been retained. 
Malaysia’s publicly displayed attitude towards this organization changed markedly when 
it played host to Kuala Lumpur CHOGM in October 1989 and the Commonwealth Games 
in 1998. The impact for hosting the Games, as can readily be seen, has not only helped 
strengthen Commonwealth links but also brought some tangible benefits to the development 
of sports in Malaysia. Though there is little evidence, however, to support that the hosting 
of these two major events indicated any strong or permanent change in Malaysia’s foreign 
policy priorities in favour of the organization, certainly it reconfirmed Malaysia’s continuing 
membership of as well as support for its existence. The Commonwealth is still of some 
importance and relevance to Malaysia, especially looking at Malaysia’s active participation 
in the activities organized by Commonwealth Secretariat. Further, Malaysia’s continuing 
membership can further help improve its image, especially when Malaysia wants to play 
an active and influential role in international affairs. Perhaps, given its potential, Malaysian 
leaders may in future find it more difficult to ignore and unnecessarily criticize this free 
association of equal members across the world. Again, if a member state is unhappy with 
an organization on the grounds of perceived ineffectiveness, the best solution is to be found 
from working within the organization rather than carping about in public. 
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